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Abstract 
How effective are systems of transparency, such as Freedom of Information (FOI) requests? 
The ambitious aims of FOI laws hinge on whether requests produce the desired information 
for the citizens or groups that use them. The question is whether such legally mandated 
requests work better than more informal mechanisms. Despite the high hopes of advocates, 
organisational routines, lack of awareness or resistance may limit legal access and public 
bodies may seek to comply minimally rather than behave in concordance with the spirit of the 
law. This paper reports a field experiment that compared FOI requests and informal non-
legal asks to assess which is more effective in accessing information from English parish 
councils. The basic premise of statutory access is borne out. FOI requests are more effective 
than simple asks and the size or pre-existing level of openness of a body appears to make 
little difference to their responsiveness. FOI requests are more effective in encouraging 
bodies to do more than the law asks (concordance) than encouraging more minimal levels of 
legal co-operation, when a body simply fulfils its obligations to varying degrees 
(compliance). This finding indicates high levels of support for FOI once it is within the 
system.  
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Introduction 
If we do not yet live in a transparent society we at least are in a time of unparalleled openness 
(Birchall 2014). Transparency is now a central tenet of democratic societies and, it is hoped, a 
vehicle for increased citizen oversight of government (Hood 2010; Grimmelikhuijsen and 
Meijer 2012). Citizens now have numerous means to access better quality information 
through a mixture of regulations and voluntary disclosures, ranging from sector based 
targeted transparency mechanisms and open data, all built around wide-ranging access to 
information laws. In the United Kingdom for example, the centrepiece of the numerous 
transparency reforms is the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000, which mandates a 
general right to request information from public bodies, subject to exclusions. Together, these 
laws and regulations create a growing transparency ecosystem (Kreimer 2008). As well as 
providing information, it is hoped that such systems can have a transformative effect on the 
health of democratic systems, triggering a wide array of instrumental benefits that range from 
greater accountability to increased trust (Fenster 2015). 
Much rests on whether FOI systems actually work and are superior as information 
gathering devices to alternative methods. FOI laws, known elsewhere as Right to Information 
or Access to Information laws, entrench a public right to request information within a set 
timeline (20 working days in the UK), subject to a set of restrictions or exemptions, with an 
independent appeal mechanism for complaints. Laws often enshrine both pro-active 
publication, for example of meeting minutes or spending, and the requirement that bodies 
respond to requests from users. In the UK, the legislation now sits alongside laws regulating 
access to meetings and environmental information, and a broad array of online data published 
as part of the UK’s Open Data initiative (Cabinet Office 2013). The hope of many reformist 
governments is that an array of such tools will cause a chain reaction, leading to successively 
greater levels of openness. This claim relies not only on the legal force of the law but also on 
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the agency giving priority to an information request as a result of internalising this norm into 
its organisational procedures (Burt and Taylor 2010). The underlying research question is 
whether an agency is more responsive to legally-mandated requests for information than a 
simple non-binding ask.  
The question might at first seem to be naïve, given the clear legal framework of FOI 
and the evidence of support for the principles of openness across bureaucracies, whether 
motivated through fear of non-compliance or support for the ideal of openness. However 
there are circumstances in which public authorities might be unwilling or unable to reply to 
even a legally mandated request. In the regulation literature there has been a large amount of 
consideration of the extent to which public authorities may resist information requests by 
those outside (Bardach and Kagan 1982). Recent criticisms by politicians have painted FOI 
regimes as misused, abused or subject to counter-productive effects (Blair 2011; Raag/CES 
2014; Independent Commission 2015). Research has also pointed to the fragility of the 
requesting process, which can be undermined by resource constraints, street-level divergence 
and, at the far end of the scale, outright adversarialism and resistance (Roberts 2015; Bauhr 
and Grimes 2014). Once within the system, requests may be subject to entropy, resistance or 
attention decay as they move through complex or unseen internal processes (Meijer 2014; 
Snell 2001).  
This paper aims to test whether and under what conditions local government is more 
responsive to an FOI request than to an informal ask for information. Simply measuring 
quantitatively the numbers of responses might overstate the supply of information (Snell 
2001: OSJI 2006). To measure effectiveness, the posing of an FOI request needs to be 
compared with a non-legal or informal ask, which can only be done in a field trial. With a 
few notable exceptions (Lewis and Wood 2012), tests of the responsiveness to information 
requests remain relatively rare.  
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Our findings show that overall FOI requests are more effective than informal asks and 
that the size or pre-existing level of openness of the targeted local authority makes little 
difference to responsiveness. A crucial distinction lies between various degrees of legal 
compliance and broader concordance. Compliance with the law means putting in place 
processes designed to meet the basic legal requirements, such as the creation of publication 
schemes or systems to answer requests. This can be done to different degrees of 
sophistication and with very different amounts of enthusiasm (Burt and Taylor 2009). This 
array of minimal approaches can be set against concordance, a wider willingness to work 
with ‘the spirit of the intentions of the FOI Act’ by moving beyond a legalistic approach to 
embrace the broader principle of being open (Richter and Wilson 2013, 181). Findings show 
that FOI requests trigger more concordance than compliance, in relative terms.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: the first section reviews the literature on 
transparency and the effectiveness of FOI; it then sets out the research site, explains the 
experimental design, reports results and finally discusses the implications of the findings for 
transparency initiatives. 
Transparency and Freedom of Information: Transformative or Trapped? 
The debate around the impact of transparency is divided between transparency optimists, who 
point to the positive benefits, and pessimists, who highlight the political and logistical 
obstacles to making any system truly work (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014). For the 
optimists, FOI carries intrinsic, normative benefits and positive instrumental repercussions 
that make it superior to any informal channel (Heald 2006; Hood 2006). First, on a symbolic 
level, the mere presence of FOI legislation can compel legal compliance out of either simple 
obedience to the law or support for the principle of openness. Research across a number of 
FOI regimes have pointed towards consistent bureaucratic support for the abstract ideal of 
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greater openness (Meijer et al. 2012; Kimball 2012; Hazell et al. 2010; Sharma 2015). 
Second, FOI laws are accompanied by a machinery of enforcement, including a statutory 
duty to ‘advise and assist’ requesters and an independent appeal system which, though it 
deals with only a small percentage of all cases, has a powerful influence in ruling and 
policing the law (Hazell et al. 2010). Finally, the fear of damaging secrecy scandals and 
anxiety over the consequences of non-compliance may negatively motivate bodies towards 
greater openness, especially ‘where information management techniques are apt to be 
portrayed as excessive secrecy or cover-ups’ (Snell 2001, 188). This mixture of gradual 
institutionalisation, support and pressure creates a positive dynamic, increasingly formalising 
procedures for making more information available and, by setting precedents, encouraging 
officials to be more inclined to provide it in the future (Prat 2006; Bauhr and Grimes 2014). 
According to optimists, in this way FOI eventually triggers a growing concordance that 
moves, over time, beyond simple compliance to legal rules. In such a ‘virtuous cycle of 
transparency’ sustained popular efforts to monitor public officials could lead to ‘mobilization, 
accountability...and institutional reform’ that would then serve to improve ‘the quality of 
government’ (Bauhr and Grimes 2014, 295).  
Pessimists present a series of counters to this positive picture. FOI sits across 
overlapping bureaucratic, legal and political dimensions that can make operation problematic 
(Terrill 2000; Snell 2001: Fenster 2015). The first pessimistic counter-argument concerns the 
strength of the process itself and the capacity of institutions. The program logic of FOI 
between request and answer is long and ‘there are many points at which the necessary 
sequence of events could break down’ as requests could go unanswered, ignored or be 
delayed (Roberts 2015, 3). Bauhr and Grimes (2014, 295) point out that the idea of a smooth 
process of requesting, disclosure and positive outcomes is highly idealised and the links in 
parts of the chain are tenuous. Problems around administrative capacity can also seriously 
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undermine the operation and any consequent benefits (Roberts 2012; 2015). The knowledge 
and availability of staff with the resources to deal with requests is crucial to the success of 
any FOI law is. In a number of countries a lack of trained personnel or resources have simply 
starved and gridlocked FOI systems (Roberts 2012; Snell 2001). 
Second, uncertainty over the process is compounded by a lack of knowledge about 
exactly what happens inside organisations: when a body receives a request it enters a black 
box (Meijer 2014). The exact response of an agency to a request may depend on the context 
and the issue at stake (Piotrowksi 2010; Welch 2012; Wilson 2015). Institutional reaction can 
vary from enthusiastic embrace through grudging compliance to outright resistance (Pasquier 
and Villenueve 2007; Kimball 2012). This reaction in turn may then determine the strength of 
response to the request, and the extent to which any FOI maintains momentum through the 
organizational chain or is lost to entropy and attention decay (Roberts 2015).  
Table 1 draws on the debate between optimists and pessimists and previous research 
to set out a series of possible responses to information requests and the type of ‘information 
behaviour’ associated with each. The distinction hinges upon a difference between various 
types of compliance (doing as the law asks to varying degrees) and concordance (behaving in 
ways that move beyond the law and doing more than it asks). 
Table 1: Responses to Information Requests and Information Behaviours 
Response Type Definition Information Behaviour 
Non-Compliance Lack of adherence to the law No response to an 
information request 
Lesser Compliance Some attempt to comply with the Generic answer or simply 
reply with no or non-specific 
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law  information  
Partial Compliance Systematic compliance with the 
law but sometimes ad hoc or 
informal 
A partial response to the 
information request 
Full Compliance Creation of procedures and 
systems, work to legal rules, strict 
fulfilling of legal obligations, with 
a technocratic, rational approach 
aimed at ‘front office performance’ 
Minimal obedience to 
request detail, answering to 
maximum time limit, 
compliance e.g. existence of 
publication schemes 
Concordance Support and embrace of principles 
beyond legal requirements, 
working towards  the ‘spirit’ of the 
law 
 
Pro-active disclosure of 
information 
(Adapted from Richter and Wilson 2013, Burt and Taylor 2009) 
In terms of measuring the outcomes between FOI requests and asks, evidence of 
compliance would find stronger differences in responsiveness at the minimal levels of 
compliance in terms of non, lesser or partial compliance (Richter and Wilson 2013, Burt and 
Taylor 2009). Greater concordance for the principles of the law would find greater 
differences for higher levels and actions that embraces the spirit of the law around promoting 
greater openness and public access (Richter and Wilson 2013; Bauhr and Grimes 2014).  
Table 2 below sets out how we incorporate these measures into the analysis. 
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It is not clear to what extent FOI regimes move from compliance to concordance over 
time. The relatively short life-span of most FOI regimes mean there are few longitudinal 
analyses of behaviour change. Roberts’ (1998) examination of more than a decade of regional 
state-level Canadian access laws found difficulties around poor compliance, resistance and 
adversarialism, reinforced by inadequate resourcing and deficient record-keeping. Snell’s 
exploration of  Australian state level laws identified a cycle of optimism giving way to a 
pessimism, with the operation of laws shaped by a similar lack of ‘administrative 
compliance’ and a ‘disappointing return on democratic dividends’ (2001, 343). Looking at 
South African local government, Berliner (2015) concluded that the operation was severely 
limited by poor resources and a lack of external monitoring, though political competition 
acted as a spur.  
Across the literature, the question of whether FOI works, and how it develops over 
time, remains open. Optimists claim transparency laws trigger a virtuous cycle of 
transparency as recipients internalize openness and transparency norms. FOI laws then 
become part of the organizational culture of recipients as bodies move from compliance to 
concordance (Richter and Wilson 2013). Pessimists question the operability of the complex 
chain of a request and point to the political and resource obstacles that can undermine the 
system and stymie any hoped for effects.   
The Experimental Site: Local Democratic Government in England 
District and county councils, the primary units of local government in England, are estimated 
to be the recipients of somewhere between 70 and 80 per cent of all FOI requests since the 
Act was implemented in 2005 (Worthy 2013: Worthy and Hazell 2016). Local government 
has been praised for its efficiency and support for FOI amid growing volumes of requests and 
severe budget cuts (Justice 2012; Richter and Wilson 2013). So far, research suggests FOI 
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processes have begun to change information flows and norms, though the precise internal 
systems vary from formalised procedures to relatively ad hoc approaches (Richter and Wilson 
2013: Burt and Taylor 2009). English local authorities are held to be generally transparent 
and accountable, with FOI now forming one part of an array of surveillance and regulatory 
mechanisms keeping them in check (Worthy 2015).
1
 In 2014, for example, central 
government reforms allowed filming and use of social media during council meetings while 
successive transparency codes have pushed proactive publication of spending and contract 
data (House of Commons Library 2014).     
Local parish and town councils, which operate as the lowest democratic unit of local 
government, were chosen as the focus for requests for a number of reasons. 
2
 First, they are 
numerous and the nearly 10,000 councils across England offered a wide sample, an important 
consideration given the anticipated low response rates to the FOI request and ask (House of 
Commons Library 2014a; Pearce and Ellwood 2002). Second, unlike other parts of local 
government many parishes appear relatively untouched by FOI (Hunt 2010). This meant, on a 
practical level, there was less risk of any requests being caught amid the increasing volumes 
found in other public bodies or slowed by the involvement of legal teams or strategies 
designed to delay or mitigate fallout of the kind seen in more politicised and experienced 
organisations (Lewis and Wood 2012; Burt and Taylor 2009).  Finally, parishes represent an 
important case study with the potential, on the one hand, for streel-level divergence as bodies 
furthest from the centre and oversight but, on the other, as agencies on the democratic 
frontline and closest to the public.  
                                                             
1 For the purposes of the study the focus is upon England. Responsibility for the administration of local government in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland lies with the respective devolved bodies. In the case of Scotland, there is a separate 
Freedom of Information Act, the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 and the Scottish equivalent of parish councils, 
called Communities, have no statutory power.  
2 Legally speaking no difference is present between parish and town councils. The latter simply serve a town, though town 
councils are held to be generally larger than parishes. 
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Compared with other parts of the UK political system little is known about parish 
councils (Pearce and Ellwood 2002). They are the lowest unit of local government in the UK, 
long established systems located at the town or village level that date back to the middle ages. 
They primarily cover rural areas and deal with local environmental, community and amenity 
issues, with additional discretionary powers over raising tax via a small precept (Wilson and 
Game 2011; House of Commons Library 2014a). It is estimated there are some 9,500 
councils and 95,000 councillors across England, covering approximately 30% of the 
population, normally over areas with a density of less than 10,000 people (House of 
Commons Library 2014; Pearce and Ellwood 2002). Recent governments have encouraged 
the creation of new parishes and offered increased powers in a bid to drive grassroots 
democratic renewal (House of Commons Library 2014a; Pearce and Ellwood 2002). This 
renewal reflects the desire of successive governments to decentralise more activities to the 
lowest elected democratic unit and re-energise local communities (Ellwood et al 2000; John 
2014). Despite this renewed democratic emphasis there has been no increase in resources. 
Beyond this any information about the detailed role and operation of parishes is 
scarce and they have been described as the ‘Cinderella’ of local democracy (Pearce and 
Ellwood 2002; Briggs 2011). There is no central database on parish councils in England so 
very little is known about the composition or structure of individual bodies. Generally 
parishes vary in their size, in their use of powers and even their composition, as some appear 
to have a greater proportion of elected councillors, while others are reliant on co-option when 
elections fail to supply sufficient candidates-though what data exists on levels of co-option 
are incomplete (Briggs 2011). Party politics appears to be rare as, when last measured in 
2002, only 10 per cent of councillors declared a party affiliation and only 4 per cent of parish 
councils were run on party lines, though again there is no recent data (Pearce and Ellwood 
2002). The public is fairly indifferent to participation in parish politics, in either the polls or 
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the annual public meetings each parish must hold by law (Pearce and Ellwood 2002; Briggs 
2011). 
Parishes and FOI 
Parish councils are covered by FOI as well as other openness laws and regulations. 
Under FOI, all bodies must have a publication scheme, a publically available document 
which details the standardised information that is to be made proactively available (House of 
Commons Library 2014). Other informational duties and obligations outside of FOI includes 
annual public meetings (a statutory requirement), the publication of minutes and agendas 
(either online or via a public noticeboard) and the right, should the populace wish, to hold a 
poll on parish issues, though these are rare due to lack of resources (Pearce and Ellwood 
2002). In addition, parish councils with a gross income above £25,000 must comply with the 
Local Government Transparency Code revised in 2015 covering the publication of spending 
over £500, organisation charts, and senior salaries (DCLG 2015). There exists a ‘draft lighter-
touch transparency code’ covering audit, expenditure and councillor responsibilities of those 
parishes with income under £25,000 (House of Commons Library 2014a). Little is known 
about the extent to which these codes, that carry at present a quasi-legal force, are understood 
or being adhered to and there is no centralised data on parish income to measure which 
parishes fall into what category.  
The effect of FOI on other parts of UK government have been studied in considerable 
detail. Research has been conducted at central government level (Hazell et al. 2010: Worthy 
and Hazell 2016) at the higher reaches of local government in England (Worthy 2013; 
Chapman and Hunt 2013; Richter and Wilson 2013) in the separate regime in Scotland 
(Taylor and Burt 2009: 2010) as well as on particular institutions such as Parliament (Hazell 
et al. 2012). There is almost no data on the effect of FOI at the parish level (see Hunt 2010).  
13 
 
Parishes are at the centre of local networks, acting as channels for both receiving and 
disseminating information (Pearce and Ellwood 2002). The traditional characterisation of 
parish politics is of councillors being contacted by telephone or in the street, shop or bar 
rather than via formal mechanisms such as FOI (Hunt 2010). The only research into parish 
council transparency found that of the sample studied ‘none of the parish or town councils 
contacted had received any FOI requests’ and that, as seen elsewhere, clerks, who are in 
administrative charge of the parish and deal with FOI, were generally supportive of the ideals 
of the law but pressed for time and resources in practice, especially as some jointly run more 
than one parish council (Hunt 2010, 50). The last attempt to monitor publication of minutes 
found only a third of parishes complying, though this was far back in 1991 (Pearce and 
Ellwood 2002).   
Consequently, how parishes react to the arrival of FOI is unclear. Outside of their 
legal obligations, parishes are more naturally reliant on local informal information networks 
(Hunt 2010). The proximity of parishes to citizens, within the same village or community, 
may make for stronger pressures for openness than a large-scale organisation, with less room 
for delay or resistance-as shown below attempts to avoid requests for information could 
become problematic (BBC 2013). However, parish councils are also far from the reach of 
regulation or monitoring, and this, combined with meagre resources, few staff and a lack of 
use, may make compliance low (Hunt 2010). For parishes openness may also be easier but 
the politics may be more intenseas in 2012 when a parish council resigned on mass over a 
stream of FOI requests following claims of the local community being excluded from 
meetings on new housing development (BBC 2012; BBC 2013). In such controversial and 
unusual cases, how a parish reacts to FOI may depend very much on its local context, though 
randomisation in the experiment reduces the effect of local context. 
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Theory and Hypotheses  
By building on the literature reviewed above, we test experimentally whether parish councils 
are more responsive to an FOI request than an informal ask for information. We also test for a 
series of relevant factors, namely prior transparency, openness, and size, which could 
influence the responsiveness to a request and then examine whether FOI is more effective at 
various levels of compliance or in concordance, as defined in Table 1. In so doing, we offer 
an insight as to where FOI sits in relation to the competing claims of optimists and 
pessimists. 
Hypothesis 1:  Local authorities will be more responsive to an FOI request than to an 
informal ask 
As outlined above, FOI laws should carry more force than a simple ask. Various 
studies have pointed towards widespread support for the principles of FOI and openness 
among officials (Hazell et al. 2010; Richter and Wilson 2013). This may also be compounded 
by the fear of the consequences of non-response, whether through personal blame or criticism 
from oversight bodies. Whether it is the symbolism, principled support or fear of the 
consequences of not complying, it is likely that FOI carries a greater power to create a 
response than an informal request.  
Hypothesis 2: Local authorities with an FOI publication scheme or with published budgets 
and minutes will be more responsive to an information request 
3
 
                                                             
3  The study design was registered at the Evidence in Government and Politics (EGAP) repository, 
http://egap.org/registration/764. Hypothesis 2 was added afterwards because of the availability of data on prior compliance 
that was not known about at the time of registration.  
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Not all public bodies begin from the same level of openness. In the UK local 
government had long been a laboratory for openness experiments of various kinds. Overall, 
local authorities have dealt better and more efficiently with a larger volume of FOI requests 
than central government (Justice 2012). The presence of a mandated publication scheme or 
the publication of statutory information can be taken as proxy of awareness. This is, however, 
only an approximate measure as research has shown how the schemes at all levels of 
government are subject to minimal compliance and neglect. As a somewhat analogue age 
device in an age of search engines, they are rarely used by the public and rarely updated by 
public bodies (see Hazell et al. 2010; Worthy 2013).  
Previous research points to the fact that bodies with greater experience of 
transparency are better placed to move from formal procedure to embedded norms. In the 
UK, local government’s long history of statutory openness has made it better able to deal 
with FOI (Worthy 2013). Local authorities have been recognized as a site of innovation and 
experimentation, moving beyond compliance through` greater proactive disclosure and a 
series of innovations such as online searchable request logs (Richter and Wilson 2013). 
Political make-up appears to have little effect on an authority’s attitude to FOI, though any 
such political effects are more complex in parishes, given that members can be co-opted and 
parishes are much less overtly political  (Worthy 2013: Pearce and Ellwood 2002).  
Hypothesis 3: Local authorities with larger population sizes will be more responsive than 
smaller authorities 
As well as the symbolic potential, the practical issues of whether there are sufficient 
resources, awareness or processes in place are key to whether a regime functions (Lewis and 
Wood 2012; Roberts 2015). Bodies with greater resources and more staff are likely to have a 
greater awareness and capacity to deal with any formal requests than those without.  
16 
 
Previous Experiments with FOI 
FOI legislation has become a common tool for experimental designs, and has been used to 
examine both the impact on the institutions subject to it and the recipients of the information 
(Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014). Requests have been used to assess the effectiveness of 
transparency laws by making standardized requests across different regimes (OSJI 2006), 
different political institutions, such as in the EU Commission (Access Info Europe 2014) and 
in studies of multiple levels of government in, for example, India (RaaG/CES 2014) and 
Brazil (Michener and Rodrigez 2015). In the US Lewis and Wood (2012) sent a series of FOI 
requests to 132 US Federal agencies composed of one innocuous and one potentially 
sensitive question. They found that the greater the political accountability of an agency, the 
less its direct democratic accountability. They concluded that greater politicization led to less 
responsiveness to FOI, especially as, comparatively, agencies proved far more responsive to 
similar questions from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the 
Congressional committee which oversees Federal agencies. Research in New Zealand by 
Price (2005) using the Official Information Act found that the law worked well as a means of 
gathering information but there were serious issues around timing and quality of some 
responses.  
Other research has looked at the effects of identity and wording to test compliance. A study 
in Mexico used parallel requests from a non-descript and an ostensibly well connected family 
name to test for partiality in bureaucratic response (Lagunes 2006) and another in the US 
used a series of parallel aggressively and politely worded formulations to test the 
effectiveness of different approaches (Cuillier 2010). Michener and Rodrigez (2015) also 
examined possible bias in responses to requests based on identity in Brazil. 
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As well as measuring FOI regimes themselves, other studies have used requests to 
measure and initiate behavior change. A series of ground level randomized controlled trials 
(RCT) have drawn on India’s Right to Information (RTI) Act 2005 (Peisakhin and Pinto 
2010; Peisakhin 2012; Bhatnagar and Jain 2013). One experiment used RTI requests to help 
process voting registration and found that the use of a request ‘results in dramatically faster 
processing times’ and is ‘almost as effective as bribery’ because officials feared non-
compliance would hinder their career (Peisakhin 2012, 12). Another examined the link 
between access to information and corruption deterrence, highlighting the rather nuanced 
consequences across different groups of beneficiaries (Shankar et al. 2011). Experiments 
measuring transparency in different policy areas, via controlled exposure to varying levels of 
information, have found considerable differences in impact depending on the policy area, 
context or recipient (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014; de Fine Licht 2014).  
Research Design 
The results and lessons from the studies above shaped this design. Across the experiments 
certain patterns are clear. First, the design relies on certain assumptions and ideas as to how 
the process works, which may not be reflected in the black box of varied institutional 
reactions (Michener and Rodrigez 2015; Lewis and Wood 2012; Price 2006). Second, 
response rates are almost always either low or very low and, within this, the quality of 
response and timing can be poor (Cuillier 2010; Michener and Rodrigez 2015).  
We use a randomized controlled trial to test whether local parish councils are more 
responsive to an FOI request than an informal ask. Parish councils were sent either an FOI 
request or an informal ask for the organization chart of the parish council. The choice of an 
organisation chart reflected the UK government’s emphasis on publishing basic 
organisational information that could serve as building blocks to create a better understanding 
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of government. An organization chart was defined as a list of councillors with names and 
responsibilities (at very least specifying who is the Chair and the Vice-Chair within a body). 
It was chosen as a relatively innocuous and piece of information easily accessible by the 
public body (Lewis and Wood 2012). It was hoped that the publication would have a 
democratic benefit for local residents and would require minimal resources to carry out.  
The request consisted of two separate parts: parishes were asked to provide the 
information required in compliance with FOI rules, and then asked to make that information 
publicly available, a step beyond what FOI rules demand, towards concordance.  
Sample 
We sent via email an FOI request, labelled as such, to the treatment group and a standard 
informal request stating explicitly it was not an FOI to the control group. These were sent to 
4,300 English parish councils drawn from 19 English counties, the organisational unit in 
which parishes are grouped (see Table A1 for a detailed breakdown in Appendix A). 
4
 The 
sample was large, given the expected low compliance and likelihood of a high number of 
potential lost requests due to blocking or error. Counties were selected on the basis of 
geographical spread, with the choice driven by the need to obtain a broadly equal dispersion 
across all of England at all four points of the compass. The selected counties encompassed 
Cornwall in the South West of England to Durham in the North West near the Scottish 
border, though some countries had to be excluded.
5
 The population density of each area was 
also variable, from 74 inhabitants per square kilometre in Cumbria to 324 in Staffordshire. As 
there was no centrally held single list of parish contact details, the list of parishes was drawn 
from the official websites of the relevant county councils and local districts. Several pieces of 
                                                             
4
 Note that on the total of 5,023 parish councils sampled roughly 4,300 have functioning e-mail addresses and 
hence could be included in the experiment. 
5
 Five English counties had to be excluded due to an ongoing experiment.  
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information for each parish were collected: the contact details of the clerk (normally an email 
rather than a physical address), the parish's website URL, and whether the FOI publication 
scheme, financial information, meeting minutes and the organization structure of the council 
were all publicly available. Parish council size was added as a control variable. Since this 
information was not available, we associated the value 0 to parish councils and the value 1 to 
town councils. Although some exceptions exist, the former are far smaller than the latter in 
terms of population.
6
  
Our sample represents roughly half of the population and is drawn from different counties in 
terms of population and geographical position (a detailed breakdown is provided in Table A1 
in Appendix A). Overall, 79 per cent of parishes either have a website or use a separate 
webpage that is part of a community/county website and 89 per cent publish a contact e-mail 
address. There was high variation in online presence between counties. In the county with the 
highest online presence more than 99 per cent of parish councils had a website and more than 
89 per cent a contact e-mail address, whereas in the county with the lowest only 47 per cent 
of parishes had web presence and 48 per cent displayed a contact e-mail address. This 
variation may be due to lack of resources and the fact that most staff are part time. 
Other studies of FOI point to support and awareness of the law as a good predictor of more 
open behaviour in the future: so past openness should predict current levels (Hazell et al 
2010: Richter and Wilson 2013). Measuring this is problematic so a series of proxy measures 
were used, namely whether a parish already published a publication scheme and other data 
such as meetings or expenses (Hazell et al. 2010, ICO 2014). 16 per cent of the parishes 
sampled had a publication scheme on their website, 25 per cent pro-actively published their 
                                                             
6
 This information is available only for roughly half of the sample. We employed another proxy for size, namely 
the amount of council tax precepted on parish councils, available via the Department for Communities and 
Local Government. For this proxy, similarly, information is only available for half of the sample. 
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expenses, 58 per cent their meeting minutes and 10 per cent the organization chart. No high 
variation was found across counties in this case. In the best (worst) performing county 21 
(12) per cent had a publication scheme, 63 (62) per cent published minutes, 10 (7) per cent 
already publish an organization chart and 34 (28) per cent detailed expenses on their 
websites.
7
 
Measures and Treatments 
Although FOI legislation is purportedly and legally ‘requester blind’, research has shown that 
bodies can react differently according to the identity, or perceived identity, of requesters 
(Cuillier 2010; Hazell et al 2010; Michener and Rodrigez 2015). The requests and asks were 
made from an NGO/campaign body called ‘Making Parishes Better Places’. 8  To avoid 
deception, it was branded as a collaboration between the named researchers and the NGO. 
The researchers believed in the objectives of the NGO and addresses and contact numbers 
were in evidence on the website: but it was also clear it was a research project. There was 
concern that if it were branded solely as a research project, it would bias responses positively, 
as awareness may encourage greater compliance, or alter responses in other ways. Given the 
sample size and power calculations, the likelihood of low response rate and concern that 
bodies respond differently to different requesters, we did not vary the identity as other studies 
have-though we would be keen to try this in future (Lagunes 2007; Cuillier 2010) 
Parish councils were block randomized within counties. We allocated the same 
treatment to parishes with shared clerks. Although multiple FOI request or asks did not 
constitute a problem, in order to avoid the situation where the same clerk receives an FOI and 
an informal ask, the randomization followed a clear procedure. All the observations were 
                                                             
7
 Table A2 in Appendix A shows the results of the balance tests. 
8
 Details available from the corresponding author. 
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collapsed to unique county-clerk values to obtain a sub-sample and the treatment was 
randomly allocated to 50 per cent of the observations within each county. The sub-sample 
was then merged with the initial one and each parish-county duplicate was associated to the 
value the respective unique parish-county received in the randomization before. The 
distribution between treatment and control group was then checked across counties and the 
overall sample.  
Clerks responsible for overseeing FOI or answer questions were asked to (i) send by 
email the organization chart of the parish council and (ii) to proactively publish this 
information either via their website or other medium, such as on a parish notice 
board/newsletter or notation in their meeting minutes (see Appendix B). A positive response 
to (i) would mean full compliance and to (ii) would be seen as evidence of concordance and 
transparency beyond what is legally required. Although such pro-active publication is not 
required by the law, the government’s Local Government Transparency Code highlights the 
need to publish certain data, and a reference was made to this (DCLG 2015). However, it is 
not known to what extent bodies are aware of the code or the extent to which it may influence 
behaviour (Worthy 2015). Distinguishing between an FOI and non-FOI request is 
problematic in the UK as requesters do not need to mention the law for it to be treated as such 
and discretion exists with the recipient. The ‘ask’ thus clearly stated that ‘this is not an FOI’.  
Measurement 
The emailing of the FOI requests and asks were managed via Qualtrics and the emails 
received back from the parish were manually coded. Requests and asks were sent on 2 June 
2015 and the coding was conducted on a rolling basis. Only one email was sent with no 
follow up, though discussions were begun with some of the parishes that responded. This was 
in part due to lack of data beyond parish email addresses (i.e. physical location), and in part 
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over the desire not to be seen to be adding to what some claim is a ‘burden’ that answering 
FOI requests impose on public authorities (Justice 2012; Independent Commission on FOI 
2015).   
Measuring and assessing responses to requests is difficult and nuanced, with different 
studies using varied approaches (see FOIA Project 2015; Darch 2013; OSJI 2006). Although 
the legal time period to reply to a FOI request is 20 working days, responses were coded up 
until the 1st August 2015, covering almost two months after the request. The coding was 
conducted by a single coder and then blind cross checking was carried out on a sub-sample: 
Cohen’s Kappa varies from 0.65 to 0.85, depending on whether the ordinal character of the 
coding is considered or not.  
Coding FOI responses is fraught with difficulty and involves clearly delineating what 
may be nuanced answers (OSJI 2006). Other research demonstrates the difficulty of precise 
categorisation of what can be a wide variety of responses (OSJI 2007: Cuillier 2010: 
Michener 2015). For example, finding clear evidence for resistance or attempted non-
compliance is problematic and assuming that a slow response equals resistance ignores the 
fact that delay is endemic to all FOI regimes and that smaller or less requested bodies 
generally have fewer resources and less experience with the practice of the law (Hazell and 
Worthy 2010). Before deciding on the coding frame numerous iterations were tried and 
tested, some of which proved too unwieldy and others too succinct. While no analyses is 
perfect, we felt that the code used came closest to serving as usable approach that combined 
brevity with sufficient flexibility to capture the nuance in response. The responses were 
coded on a five scale ordinal variable that could capture fairly the nuances of responses 
between a non-response and an answer of varying obligation and usefulness: Table 2 shows 
the coding scheme, making reference to the categories used in Table 1 above. 
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Table 2: Coding Scheme for Responses 
 0: No reply. We coded 0 those parish councils which did not reply to the request by email. 
[non-compliance] 
 1: Reply. We coded 1 those parish councils which replied to the request by email, but which 
did not provide the organization chart or any detailed information. We also coded 1 those 
who sent a link only to their website (unless the organization chart, as defined above, is on 
the homepage) or those who only made general reference to the website. [lesser compliance] 
 2: Link or background. We coded 2 those parish councils which replied to the request by 
email with links directly to the organization chart or background data (where the information 
must be clearly visible by clicking the link they provided) or provided a generic link along 
with exact instructions where to find the information. [partial compliance] 
 3: Send chart. We coded 3 those parish councils which provided the organization chart 
itself, whether as an attachment or in the body of the email. [full compliance] 
 4: Make public. We coded 4 those parish councils which sent us the organization chart and 
which explicitly stated the intent to publish it in the public domain as a result of our request 
(in the website, in notice boards, minutes) or where it was already public.[concordance] 
 
This scale was re-operationalized into two dichotomous variables, measuring 
respectively minimal legal compliance and concordance in order to test the relative effect of 
an FOI request compared with an ‘ask’. Compliance was measured with a dichotomous 
variable assuming value 1 for the category Give Location and Send Chart and value 0 for all 
24 
 
the remaining categories. For concordance, instead, we associated value 1 to Make Public and 
value 0 to the remaining categories. 
Results 
As with other studies using FOI, the overall response rate was low (Cuillier 2010; Michener 
and Rodrigez 2015). Before the experiment a 10 per cent response rate was estimated. 
Overall, 637 parishes replied from a total of 4,312 contacted, a slightly higher than predicted 
successful response rate of almost 15 per cent, which is comparable with previous studies 
(Cuillier 2010).  The high degree of non-compliance may be down to the fragile nature of 
parts of the requesting process, from the accuracy of e-mail addresses to the blocking or loss 
of requests in junk folders. Perhaps the most important reasons for the low response rate lies 
with the fact that parish clerks, working part-time with few resources, may simply find that 
answering an FOI may be ‘a long way down the list of pressing activities’ at a time of scant 
resources (Hunt 2010, 49). 
However, taking this basic measure, parishes contacted through an FOI were more 
than twice as likely to respond than those that were simply ‘asked’, with 438 FOIs answered 
against 199 asks: 20.62 per cent against 9.21 per cent. Cross-tabulation of the responses 
shows a statistically significant difference in the reply to a FOI request with respect to an 
informal ask (p. < .001). Table 3 contains the percentages for the different kinds of reply. 
Across each category, the FOI request is more effective than the informal ask. The 
relationships between each of these categories and all other responses are statistically 
significant when cross-tabulated with the treatment (p. < .001).   
 
Table 3: Effects of Requests on Responsiveness 
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This 
relationship is 
confirmed by the 
ordinal regression presented in Table 4. Model 1 shows the results of the regression analysis 
(with standard errors clustered across counties), which controls for the current levels of 
transparency in the parish. Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 show the same regression analysis 
as in Model 1, but respectively add size as control variable and interaction terms between size 
and treatment and size and FOI. Size is used as a proxy for supply side differences such as 
resources available and FOI as a proxy of current openness. Unfortunately, the proxy used is 
available only for half of the sample. As can be seen, a statistically significant and positive 
relationship is present between the treatment and the dependent variable that is robust across 
different models. In other words, those parish councils that receive an FOI request are more 
Response Normal 
 (Treatment=0) 
FOI 
(Treatment=1) 
Total 
No reply (0)  
[Non-compliance] 
 90.79       79.65 85.23 
Reply (1) 
[Lesser compliance] 
4.63 8.36 6.49 
Link or background (2) 
[Partial compliance] 
1.44 2.60 2.02 
Send chart (3) 
[Full compliance] 
2.82 7.81 5.31 
Make public (4) 
[Concordance] 
0.32 1.58 0.95 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 2,160 2,152 4,312 
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likely to be more responsive than those that receive an informal ask. This finding shows that 
FOI requests trigger more responsiveness than non-legal asks: H1 finds empirical support.  
H2 hypothesised that previous levels of transparency might affect parish councils’ 
current openness. Whether the parish council publishes an FOI publication scheme, expenses 
and minutes might affect its level of responsiveness. A statistically significant and positive 
relationship is present between the dependent variable and the level of previous transparency. 
However, this relationship is not robust across models: only the relationship between whether 
the parish council publishes expenses and the dependent variable remains statistically 
significant across models and its significance is also reduced. Surprisingly, whether the parish 
council already publishes an organization chart does not affect responsiveness. This finding is 
puzzling since those councils that already have an item of information available are 
presumably more aware of the law.
9
 This may, at least in part, be due to the fact that the law 
mandates that agencies notify the requester of the existence of already published information 
(e.g. through a web link) but does not ask that they supply the document itself. Finally, size is 
not statistically significant across models either. Consequently, neither the degree of pre-
existing transparency, as a proxy for awareness, nor the size of a parish council, as a proxy 
for resources, influences responsiveness when interacted with the treatment. In conclusion, 
H2 and H3 are not confirmed: neither the pre-existing degree of openness of the parish council 
nor its size has significant effect on its responsiveness.
10
  
 
                                                             
9 We investigated whether having a chart on the website is correlated to any of the categories of the ordered dependent 
variable. We find that there is a significant relationship between having already the chart published and giving its location, 
and it is a positive one though, interestingly, there is no relationship is present between having a chart already and sending it. 
This may be down to the law itself in relation to previously published information, as described above. 
10 These results are confirmed also when we cluster standard errors according to shared clerks (see Table A3 in Appendix A) 
and when we use a different proxy for size (see Table A5 in Appendix A). Rrobustness checks using the other proxy for size 
show that findings are the same, regardless of the different proxy for size used in the analysis. The only different is that, 
when we use the other proxy for size, the treatment is significant in Model 3 only when interacted with the variable 
measuring whether the parish council has a publication scheme. 
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Table 4: The impact of FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness (Ordered Probit) 
     
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
FOI  0.123** 0.104 0.103 0.138 
 (0.0493) (0.0666) (0.0692) (0.121) 
Expenses 0.136** 0.163* 0.170* 0.163* 
 (0.0616) (0.0955) (0.0993) (0.0954) 
Minutes 0.135* 0.00513 0.000511 0.00520 
 (0.0709) (0.0445) (0.0466) (0.0445) 
Organization Chart 0.0592 -0.0160 -0.0125 -0.0156 
 (0.0494) (0.0731) (0.0732) (0.0733) 
Treatment 0.509*** 0.481*** 0.443*** 0.492*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0516) (0.0715) (0.0547) 
Size  0.162** -0.0447 0.161** 
  (0.0740) (0.187) (0.0727) 
Treatment#Size   0.341  
   (0.258)  
Treatment#FOI    -0.0554 
    (0.130) 
Cut1 1.501*** 1.374*** 1.350*** 1.381*** 
 (0.0805) (0.0738) (0.0835) (0.0829) 
Cut2 1.856*** 1.731*** 1.707*** 1.737*** 
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 (0.0831) (0.0708) (0.0751) (0.0781) 
Cut3 2.009*** 1.870*** 1.847*** 1.876*** 
 (0.0901) (0.0728) (0.0785) (0.0787) 
Cut4 2.851*** 2.719*** 2.697*** 2.726*** 
 (0.0910) (0.0740) (0.0775) (0.0777) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2476.4247 -1349.0944 -1347.7167 -1349.034 
Observations 4,312 2,257 2,257 2,257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The final test aims to provide insights into the area of compliance versus concordance. 
Table 5 shows the results of two probit models respectively on the variable measuring legal 
compliance and the variable measuring concordance. 
11
 As H1 suggests, FOI requests are 
more effective than an informal ask in both cases. 
The effect of an FOI request is stronger for concordance than compliance in relative 
terms. 
12
 It is possible to see the difference in responsiveness from the observed responses for 
each category: in terms of full (legal) compliance 9.2 per cent responded to the informal ask 
and 20.6 per cent responded to the FOI, so an FOI is 2.2 times more likely to elicit a response 
than the ask. For concordance, only 3.2 per cent responded to the informal ask and 9.4 
responded to the FOI, making the FOI three times more effective. By comparing the level of 
responsiveness in regressions, using the change in predicted probabilities, FOI requests are 
twice as effective as an ask for lower levels of compliance, but four times as effective as an 
ask for higher levels. The probability of compliance with an informal ask is 5 per cent, 
compared to a 10 per cent probability with an FOI request. The probability of concordance 
                                                             
11 The variable measuring concordance can be conceived as measuring rare events. In this vein, we carried out robustness 
checks with various rare events logistic regression models. Results do not change from the analyses shown in the text. 
Rather, the effect of FOI requests on responsiveness is found to be stronger in absolute terms: see Table A7 in Appendix A. 
12 This is confirmed also in the robustness checks in Appendix A. The same analysis is run by using the other proxy for size 
mentioned above, namely the amount of council tax raised from the parish, and by clustering standard errors for clerks: 
results prove to be robust. See Appendix A Table A4 and A6. 
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with an informal ask is 0.3 per cent whereas with an FOI request it is 1.4. FOI requests are 
more effective than informal asks, but effectiveness is not influenced by pre-existing 
openness or the availability of resources. Furthermore, FOI is more effective at the higher 
levels of concordance than it is at levels of compliance. 
Table 5: Parish Council Responsiveness to FOI - Legal Compliance and Concordance 
(Probit) 
 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Legal 
Compliance 
Concordance Concordance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
FOI 0.144* 0.130 0.0376 -0.280 
 (0.0750) (0.0966) (0.204) (0.313) 
Expenses 0.110* 0.0750 0.0622 0.283 
 (0.0629) (0.123) (0.174) (0.234) 
Minutes 0.137* -0.00951 0.168 0.205 
 (0.0806) (0.0804) (0.130) (0.157) 
Organization Chart 0.108* 0.0382 -0.00512 -0.517 
 (0.0642) (0.104) (0.189) (0.361) 
Treatment 0.470*** 0.370*** 0.581*** 0.506*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0769) (0.141) (0.171) 
Size  0.367***  -0.249 
  (0.0850)  (0.402) 
Constant -1.901*** -1.729*** -2.872*** -2.773*** 
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 (0.112) (0.0993) (0.180) (0.132) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1084.845 -593.754   ?????? ?????? 
Observations 4,312 2,257 4,312 2,257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Conclusions 
FOI requests do work when compared to an informal ask. Given the many potential pitfalls 
and criticisms, from politics to resources, this finding is important. As a system and policy, 
FOI carries numerous pitfalls and unintended consequences, but it is clearly superior to 
informal access. Parishes receive relatively few requests and would be likely candidates to 
seek to avoid the law, given their scant resources and low profile (Gofen 2014). Against the 
presumption of attention decay and entropy, FOI requests are relatively more effective at 
higher levels of concordance than at lower levels, a seemingly counter-intuitive finding. 
When compared to an informal ask, a FOI request becomes more effective than asking as it 
moves through the process, gathering rather than losing force as the requests move up 
graduations of compliance. FOI has an impact outside the boundaries but within the ‘spirit’ of 
the law. FOI requests, it appears, are not perceived by local authorities as mere legal 
instruments to be ‘minimally complied’ with, but carry some further weight, most likely 
support for the principle of openness seen in organisations elsewhere (Hunt 2010; Richter and 
Wilson 2013). The concordance is likely to be mutually reinforcing as a growing 
commitment to the principles of openness and shifting information flows within public bodies 
work together, a change identified in other local government studies in the UK (Richter and 
Wilson 2010; Burt and Taylor 2010). Rather than requests becoming lost amid internal 
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bureaucracy, the bottleneck appears to be at the beginning of the chain. Emphasis should be 
on getting FOI requests over the first hurdle of a response. 
Against the evidence from elsewhere, pre-existing levels of transparency did not 
determine the type of response, though publication schemes and website mentions represent 
an imperfect measure and others could be sought (Worthy 2013). Nor did size matter. While 
evidence from elsewhere points to larger and more resource rich organizations being 
generally more receptive, it is possible that the relative difference between parishes is simply 
too small to register (Roberts 2015). But it does show the responsiveness can happen right 
across the administrative system and is not confined to experienced authorities. 
However, the low response rate demonstrates how brittle the program logic of FOI 
may be in practice (Roberts 2015). While there is impressive evidence of a willingness to 
move beyond the law once a request is responded to, there may be serious difficulties with 
the area of minimal or less than minimal compliance (Richter and Wilson 2013). A complex 
mixture of technical and resource obstacles, not least the reliance of parishes on voluntary 
part-time administrators, can act as a powerful brake on the openness of a system at the point 
of a request arriving (Hunt 2010). As transparency legislation spreads across the world, this 
may offer food for thought in a country where the Act is generally held to be working well, 
and is often cited as one of the better examples of a successful FOI regime (Justice 2012; 
Worthy and Hazell 2016).  
The findings offer a first insight into the workings of openness laws at the lowest 
level, furthest from the focus of the media and nearest to the community (Hazell et al. 2010). 
The findings did not, of course, tell us exactly why requests were responded to and what 
mixture of duty, diligence or obligation pushed the process. It may be that some bodies do 
view information interaction as an ‘inherently administrative task’ while others that see it as 
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‘a catalyst for organisational change’ or part of a ‘fundamental’ shift...within the democratic 
system’ (Burt and Taylor 2009, 185). Future research could examine how FOI fits as an 
information channel within local organisations and how the law fits alongside more informal 
modes of communication. It also added to our understanding of FOI’s use as an experimental 
tool and its limitations. As with other attempts design was difficult, particularly as basic 
information was unavailable. Response rates were also low and demonstrated a varied 
understanding of the question and law, perhaps reflecting the different ad hoc or more 
formalised approaches to answering requests (Burt and Taylor 2009). In spite of these 
limitations, we have provided evidence that these transparency devices do work and give 
relevant information that can help governance and provide important democratic information 
to the public. 
 More experiments need to be done to extend the findings to other jurisdictions and 
levels of government. Future research could experiment with different requester identities and 
approaches, as tried elsewhere to examine whether, for example, a journalist, a campaigner or 
an aggrieved local resident obtained different levels of help or also use of varying 
approaches, from a physical letter to email (Cuillier 2010; Lagunes 2007). There could also 
be the opportunity to contact further the bodies to examine their experience and information 
environments and how FOI fits with the possibly local and informal ‘information ecosystems’ 
that exist (Kreimer 2008).  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Parish Councils in the Sample 
County 
Number of 
parish 
councils Region Population 
Population 
Density 
(people per 
km2) 
Cornwall 212 South West 536000 151 
Devon 403 South West 1135700 114 
Somerset 403 South West 910200 154 
Dorset 273 South West 413800 163 
Gloucestershire 119 South West 598300 225 
Wiltshire 252 South West 684000 196 
Cumbria 267 North West 499800 74 
Warwickshire 208 West 545474 277 
Shropshire 148 West 473900 136 
Cheshire 217 West 1028600 439 
Staffordshire 187 West 849600 324 
Isle of Wight 33 South East 138400 364 
Surrey 81 South East 1135500 683 
Durham 40 North East 902500 332 
Northumberland 151 North East 316300 63 
Norfolk  381 East 859400 160 
Lincolnshire 474 East 104200 150 
Derbyshire 250 East 770600 303 
Yorkshire  924 East 5284000 343 
     Total 5023 
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Table A2: Balance Tests 
Control Variables Control (0)  Treated 
(1) 
Total N 
FOI=0 50.27 49.73 100.0 3,533 
FOI=1 49.29 | 50.71 100.0 779 
Expenses=0 49.64 50.36 100.0 3,078 
Expenses=1 51.22 | 48.78 100.0 1,234 
Minutes=0 48.70 51.30 100.0 1,497 
Minutes =1 50.83 49.17 100.0 2,815 
Organization 
Chart=0 
49.97 50.03 100.0 3,810 
Organization 
Chart=1 
51.00  
 
49.00 100.0 502 
Size=0 49.58  
 
50.42 100.0 2,037 
Size=1  52.73  
 
47.27 100.0 220 
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Table A3: Ordered Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness – SE Clustered by 
Clerks 
    
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
FOI  0.123* 0.104 0.177 
 (0.0678) (0.0953) (0.136) 
Expenses 0.136** 0.163* 0.169* 
 (0.0628) (0.0876) (0.0880) 
Minutes 0.135** 0.00513 3.61e-05 
 (0.0613) (0.0795) (0.0796) 
Organization Chart 0.0592 -0.0160 -0.0109 
 (0.0725) (0.0956) (0.0959) 
Treatment 0.509*** 0.481*** 0.464*** 
 (0.0520) (0.0685) (0.0790) 
Size  0.162 -0.0682 
  (0.107) (0.171) 
Treatment#Size   0.377* 
   (0.214) 
Treatment#FOI   -0.121 
   (0.162) 
Cut1 1.501*** 1.374*** 1.362*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0700) (0.0733) 
Cut2 1.856*** 1.731*** 1.720*** 
 (0.0590) (0.0744) (0.0767) 
Cut3 2.009*** 1.870*** 1.859*** 
 (0.0616) (0.0761) (0.0787) 
Cut4 2.851*** 2.719*** 2.710*** 
 (0.0842) (0.101) (0.103) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2476.425 -1349.094 -1347.443 
Observations 4,312 2,257 2,257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness - Legal Compliance and 
Concordance - SE Clustered by Clerks 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Legal 
Compliance  
Concordance Concordance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
FOI 0.144* 0.130 0.0376 -0.280 
 (0.0842) (0.121) (0.169) (0.277) 
Expenses 0.110 0.0750 0.0622 0.283 
 (0.0782) (0.110) (0.157) (0.212) 
Minutes 0.137* -0.00951 0.168 0.205 
 (0.0755) (0.0969) (0.174) (0.197) 
Organization Chart 0.108 0.0382 -0.00512 -0.517 
 (0.0900) (0.121) (0.178) (0.360) 
Treatment 0.470*** 0.370*** 0.581*** 0.506*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0846) (0.143) (0.177) 
Size  0.367***  -0.249 
  (0.124)  (0.380) 
Constant -1.901*** -1.729*** -2.872*** -2.773*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0858) (0.170) (0.174) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1084.845 -593.754 -220.477 -120.872 
Observations 4,312 2,257 4,312 2,257 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5: Ordered Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness – Different Size Proxy 
    
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
FOI  0.123** 0.0728 -0.180 
 (0.0493) (0.0885) (0.181) 
Expenses 0.136** -0.00475 -0.00600 
 (0.0616) (0.0869) (0.0875) 
Minutes 0.135* 0.133 0.130 
 (0.0709) (0.142) (0.143) 
Organization Chart 0.0592 0.182** 0.173** 
 (0.0494) (0.0733) (0.0809) 
Treatment 0.509*** 0.596*** 0.521 
 (0.0471) (0.0967) (0.694) 
Size  0.0489 0.0509 
  (0.0300) (0.0640) 
Treatment#Size   -0.00198 
   (0.0760) 
Treatment#FOI   0.415** 
   (0.190) 
Cut1 1.501*** 1.937*** 1.896*** 
 (0.0805) (0.313) (0.615) 
Cut2 1.856*** 2.306*** 2.266*** 
 (0.0831) (0.324) (0.627) 
Cut3 2.009*** 2.464*** 2.424*** 
 (0.0901) (0.324) (0.612) 
Cut4 2.851*** 3.284*** 3.249*** 
  (0.0910) (0.400) (0.656) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2476.425 -815.528 -813.411 
Observations 4,312 1,390 1,390 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6: Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness - Legal Compliance and 
Concordance - Different Size Proxy 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Legal 
Compliance  
Concordanc
e 
Concordanc
e 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
FOI 0.144* 0.0265 0.0376 0.498*** 
 (0.0750) (0.115) (0.204) (0.164) 
Expenses 0.110* 0.00876 0.0622 -0.321** 
 (0.0629) (0.100) (0.174) (0.141) 
Minutes 0.137* 0.232 0.168 -0.0108 
 (0.0806) (0.185) (0.130) (0.208) 
Organization Chart 0.108* 0.107 -0.00512 0.481*** 
 (0.0642) (0.124) (0.189) (0.100) 
Treatment 0.470*** 0.550*** 0.581*** 0.711*** 
 (0.0713) (0.101) (0.141) (0.260) 
Size  0.0510  -0.0591 
  (0.0347)  (0.0992) 
Constant -1.901*** -2.431*** -2.872*** -2.358** 
 (0.112) (0.289) (0.180) (1.143) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1084.845   -348.593 -220.477 -74.834   
Observations 4,312 1,390 4,312 1,390 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: Probit FOI on Parish Council Responsiveness - Legal Compliance and 
Concordance – Firth logit 
 Legal 
Compliance 
Legal 
Compliance  
Concordance Concordance 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
FOI 0.279* -0.627 0.135 -0.627 
 (0.163) (0.641) (0.435) (0.641) 
Expenses 0.214 0.712 0.151 0.712 
 (0.155) (0.505) (0.403) (0.505) 
Minutes 0.300* 0.471 0.420 0.471 
 (0.153) (0.524) (0.401) (0.524) 
Organization Chart 0.215 -0.940 0.0926 -0.940 
 (0.172) (0.883) (0.463) (0.883) 
Treatment 0.969*** 1.247** 1.550*** 1.247** 
 (0.128) (0.488) (0.404) (0.488) 
Size  -0.277  -0.277 
  (0.874)  (0.874) 
Constant -3.482*** -5.595*** -6.007*** -5.595*** 
 (0.148) (0.546) (0.457) (0.546) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1072.231 -116.660   -214.064 -116.660   
Observations 4,312 2,257 4,312 2,257 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B 
Treatment Letter 
From: Making Parishes Better Places 
RE: FOI Request 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
We represent a group called Making Parishes Better Places contacting you as part of a research 
project examining the impact of FOI on openness in local government. As part of our commitment to 
opening up parishes we ask under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for a copy of an organisation 
chart detailing the structure of the council and the committee membership for *. Please email it to: #. 
In line with the government’s 2015 Local Government Transparency Code, we also ask that you 
publish the information on the homepage of your own website or, if you do not have a website, 
display it in a public place or note it in your meeting minutes. 
 
If you have time, please let us know what you intend to do: * 
 
Please contact us if you require further clarification at #. 
 
Yours Faithfully, 
 
Making Parishes Better Places 
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Control Letter 
From: Making Parishes Better Places 
RE: Request 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
We represent a group called Making Parishes Better Places contacting you as part of a research 
project examining the openness in local government. As part of our commitment to opening up 
parishes we ask you for a copy of an organisation chart detailing the structure of the council and the 
committee membership for *. Please email it to: #. 
Please note that this is not an FOI request. 
 
In line with the government’s 2015 Local Government Transparency Code, we also ask that you 
publish the information on the homepage of your own website or, if you do not have a website, 
display it in a public place or note it in your meeting minutes. 
 
If you have time, please let us know what you intend to do: * 
 
Please contact us if you require further clarification at #. 
 
Yours Faithfully, 
 
 
Making Parishes Better Places 
 
 
 
 
 
 
